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This article considers how autocrats decide to expand or narrow the issue diversity of their 
policy agenda during a period of political liberalization. Prior studies have two competing 
perspectives. First, political liberalization increases the social and political freedom that enhances 
information exchange, and thus expands issue diversity. Second, political liberalization decreases 
government’s control of the legislature and thus narrows the issue diversity. This article offers a 
novel theoretical perspective by combining these two countervailing theories. It predicts a 
diminishing marginal benefit of information exchange and an increasing marginal bargaining 
cost. As such, this article argues that issue diversity follows a negative quadratic (inverted-U) 
relationship as the regimes liberalize. The analysis of a new and unique dataset of Hong Kong’s 
legislative agenda (1975 to 2016) offers support for this theory. This study contributes to our 
knowledge of policymaking in authoritarian regimes and the theory of information processing. 
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 Introduction 
Different policy issues compete with each other and are at the heart of the study of the 
policymaking processes (Bevan, 2015; Greene, 2016; Jennings et al., 2011; John & Margetts, 
2003). Competition between issues inundates policymakers with a vast amount of information. 
Different political actors advocate different policy concerns and problems from a wide range of 
issues such as the economy, trades, labour, public services, crime, transportation, welfare, 
education, and health. The overwhelming information requires policymakers to decide what to 
pay attention to and what to ignore (Chan & Lam, 2018; Jones, 2001; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005; Walgrave & Dejaeghere, 2017). If the policymakers pay no attention to a certain piece of 
information, policy change cannot take place (Baumgartner, Jones, & Wilkerson, 2011, pp. 948–
9). Therefore, understanding the allocation of attention has a profound implication on policy 
change. 
This study examines issue diversity of the policy agenda—the concentration of 
policymakers’ attention across different policy issues. It looks at a portfolio of policy issues 
rather than a single or a few issues. The allocation of attention to issues are not independent; 
paying more attention to one issue would inevitably mean less to another (Zhu, 1992). The study 
of issue diversity of the policy agenda can capture the interdependence of policy attention (True, 
Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). 
Most related works focusing on advanced democracies suggests that the electoral process 
has a vital role in shaping the political attention (Jennings et al., 2011; Greene, 2016; Green-
Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010). They do not consider, however, the possible effect of political 
liberalization on issue diversity of the policy agenda. This paper considers how autocrats decide 
 to expand or narrow their focus on policy issues in their finite policy portfolio. Theorizing and 
examining how issues compete in authoritarian regimes when regimes liberalize provide an 
opportunity to understand the effect of institutional change and political parties in the policy 
agenda debate. 
Following Dahl’s classic work Polyarchy (1973), political liberalization is defined as 
more inclusive and competitive elections (see also Coppedge, Alvarez, & Maldonado, 2008). 
Political liberalization leads autocrats to have less control and political advantage over political 
affairs. The process of political liberalization injects the systems with more democratic elements 
such as the right to elect and the right to be elected. In more inclusive and competitive elections, 
candidates that do not belong to the governing party can participate in the electoral process and 
have a chance to enter the legislature through electoral campaigns. Candidates thus have more 
freedom to organize and form a political party so that they can have more political capital 
(Wahman, 2011) and have greater chance to defeat the autocrats (Levitsky & Way, 2010). An 
implication of the process of political liberalization, defined as more inclusive and competitive 
elections, is that it increases the number of political parties and changes the partisan composition 
of the legislature—moving the authoritarian regimes away from the common one-party system or 
one-party dominant system. As such, it changes the party system and power distribution of the 
political system and alters the policymaking processes. 
To understand the effect of political liberalization on issue diversity of the policy agenda, 
this paper offers a hybrid model by combining the insights of the contradicting bargaining and 
information exchange perspectives on policy processes. These two perspectives are distinct 
proponents developed in advanced democracies that explain how the changes in the composition 
of the legislature affect the policy processes. The bargaining perspective, informed by the veto 
 player, political gridlock and logrolling literature, asserts that a greater number of political parties 
increases the costs of policymaking (de Marchi & Laver, forthcoming; Mayhew, 1991; Tsebelis, 
2002). A greater number of political parties becomes an obstacle to the policymaking processes. 
It becomes more difficult to coordinate and secure consensus. In this way, a higher bargaining 
cost reduces the total number of policies. The entire agenda space thus shrinks, and issue 
diversity of the policy agenda also diminishes. Whereas, the information exchange process, 
informed by the issue competition literature, suggests that political parties provide policy-
relevant information, expand policymakers’ political attention and result in a greater issue 
diversity of the policy agenda, meaning that policymakers become more attentive to policy issues 
from broader policy topics (Greene, 2016; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010). These two 
perspectives, however, yield opposite and unresolved theoretical expectations. 
Following Walgrave and Varone (2008), the hybrid model of issue diversity of the policy 
agenda treats political parties as the key actors in the policy process. It argues that the electoral 
systems and the corresponding changes in the partisan composition of the legislature are both the 
source of bargaining and source of information exchange. It asserts that, as regimes liberalize, a 
greater number of political parties provide a diminishing marginal benefit of information 
exchange but also incurs an increasing marginal bargaining cost. As such, the hybrid model of 
these two countervailing processes expects that the two effects cancel each other when reaching a 
maximum equilibrium point, and thus results in a negative quadratic (inverted-U) relationship 
between the number of political parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda. Although the 
focus of this article is autocracies, the model is developed by combining theories in democracies 
as well as autocracies. It thus has an important implication on the wider study of comparative 
public policy. 
 Obviously, political parties are not the only political actors that influence how the 
government allocates its political attention across policy issues. Extant research shows that 
different political actors such as bureaucrats (Chan & Lam, 2018) and the court (Owens, 2010) 
have an impact on the policy processes. In particular, when regimes liberalize, interest groups 
(Bunea & Thomson, 2015) and civil society (Zhan & Tang, 2013) could have substantial 
influences on policy change should they become more vocal. Moreover, different actors of 
different sectors (e.g., the governing party and business elites or the opposition party and civil 
society) can form a stronger network to influence the policy processes (Wahman, 2011). Still, 
some research focuses only on the effect of political parties on policy change (König, Tsebelis, & 
Debus, 2010). More importantly, many of the social demands from the interest groups and civil 
society create social cleavages. These social cleavages are reflected in the electoral arena that 
determines the number of political parties in the legislature (Ferrara, 2011). Therefore, it is 
theoretically interesting to focus on the influence of political parties and examine how it changes 
issue diversity of the policy agenda. 
To test the effect of political parties during a period of political liberalization, this article 
analyses a novel and unique dataset from an undemocratic but transitioning system: the 
legislative bills of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) between 1975 and 2016. Hong 
Kong’s unique path of prolonged democratization offers a valuable opportunity to observe the 
effect of political liberalization and partisan composition of the legislature on issue diversity of 
the policy agenda. The result shows a negative quadratic pattern between the number of political 
parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda and thus provides rigorous support to the hybrid 
model. 
 To further illustrate the above ideas and finding, this article is structured as follows. First, 
it presents different theories of issue diversity of the policy agenda based on the partisan 
composition of the legislature. Then, it generates a hypothesis of the effect of political 
liberalization on issue diversity of the policy agenda. Next, to test the hypothesis, it undertakes a 
time-series analysis of the issue diversity of the legislative agenda in Hong Kong and evaluates to 
what extent the empirical evidence supports different theoretical expectations. 
Models on issue diversity of the policy agenda 
Prior studies show two countervailing processes on how different partisan composition of 
legislature affects issue diversity of the policy agenda, namely, the bargaining cost and 
information exchange. This section discusses a novel theoretical perspective that combines the 
insights of these two processes and presents the observable implication. 
Bargaining process 
Policymaking is a bargaining process that involves the compromise and the trade of 
political interests (de Marchi & Laver, forthcoming; Eguia & Shepsle, 2015; Tsebelis, 2002). The 
change in rules and ideological positions would change bargaining costs and thus the policy 
outcome. Bargaining process, as informed by the veto player, political gridlock and logrolling 
literature, states that a greater number of political parties increases bargaining costs of 
policymaking and thus it is harder to produce more laws. As such, a lower number of laws 
reduces issue diversity of the policy agenda. 
The selectorate theory asserts that autocrats have to pay attention to a small group of 
selectorate only (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Manion, 2017). 
 Although disagreements could exist among the selectorate (Miners, 1994), their ideological 
positions are more homogenous than the wider public. Similar to many previous works, this study 
assumes selectorates as homogenous. As such, the bargaining process of the policymaking in 
authoritarian regimes is smooth and easy (Truex, 2014). 
The process of political liberalization in authoritarian regimes increases the size of the 
selectorate. It is because the introduction of more inclusive and competitive elections allows 
more people to be elected and compete in the electoral process (Dahl, 1973). As such, it requires 
a more considerable effort to reach a consensus between actors with different political motives, 
stances, ideas, and interests (Eguia & Shepsle, 2015; König et al., 2010). It thus increases 
bargaining costs for policymaking. Although autocrats usually possess more resources and thus 
have more advantage in mobilization (Svolik, 2012; Wong, 2014), more inclusive and 
competitive elections also increase the likelihood that political opposition and political parties 
with wider socio-economic backgrounds will be elected to the legislature. Each of these political 
parties, because of their diverse backgrounds, possesses different knowledge, ideas, and political 
stances. To deal with the inundating information, the government is thus required to spend more 
time and effort to sort and filter out the diverse information in their formulation of public policy 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2015). 
Through more inclusive and competitive elections, political parties with diverse political 
and socio-economic backgrounds make it more difficult to adjudicate multiple competing 
interests. This increases the level of institutional friction (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005) and the 
system is more prone to political gridlock (Baumgartner, Brouard, Grossman, Lazardeux, & 
Moody, 2013), though it may not affect important legislation (Adler & Wilkerson, 2012). For 
instance, the veto player theory (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002) dictates that more 
 political parties in the legislature increase the total number of veto points, if their policy positions 
are very different in multiple policy domains. In effect, more veto points reduce the likelihood of 
the passage of a legislative bill. Alternatively, a greater number of political parties with diverse 
interests and policy positions create more opportunities for logrolling (or policy trades) (de 
Marchi & Laver, forthcoming; Greene & Jensen, 2018). Political parties bargain with each other 
and trade their votes for less salient issues with other parties, so that they can gather enough 
support to get their most salient policies passed. However, searching for an optimal position in a 
logrolling process requires “huge cognitive and informational challenges to negotiators” (de 
Marchi & Laver, forthcoming, p. 41) and it delays the policy process. As such, increased 
opportunities for policy trades increase bargaining costs. Thus, various theories seem to suggest 
that, when a regime liberalizes, the diverse political stances and socio-economic backgrounds of 
the legislature increases bargaining costs. It inevitably deters autocrats from producing more 
policies. 
As agenda space and policy outputs are more constrained, autocrats have less room to 
adjust their policy portfolio. As a result, they have to focus on fewer policy issues and thus issue 
diversity of the policy agenda shrinks. In brief, a greater number of political parties increases 
bargaining costs, and therefore the government will find it more difficult to produce more 
policies to address a wider variety of issues. 
Information exchange process 
Information is valuable for policymaking (Alexander, Lewis, & Considine, 2011). The 
diversity of information matters to good policy outcomes because diversity leads to different 
competing and debatable perspectives (Schattschneider, 1960), through which a more 
competitive and convincing solution is more likely to be adopted to drive the society forward 
 (Page, 2008). The information exchange process states that a greater number of political parties 
provide more information for policymaking and thus it increases issue diversity of the policy 
agenda in liberalizing authoritarian regimes. 
Compared to democracies, autocrats have far less access to information due to the 
systematic constraints of their politically illiberal environment (Chan & Zhao, 2016; Wallace, 
2016). For instance, in the absence of a genuine election, autocrats have incentives to pay 
attention to a few powerful elites (the selectorate) only (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Manion, 
2017). The selectorate has a more homogenous interest than the public. The selectorate theory 
implies that information exchange is limited in authoritarian regimes. 
In addition, in order to maintain the regime stability, autocrats suppress information by 
repressing the media (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011) and social contentions (Fu, 2017). 
Ironically, however, as the media and public express less about their concerns and discontents, 
the autocrats receive fewer policy-relevant information and are more reluctant to make policy 
change (Chan & Zhao, 2016). 
To minimize the unfavourable outcomes due to the lack of supply of policy-relevant 
information, some autocrats seek independent, credible and diversified information sources that 
can improve their policymaking and governance (Dickson, 2016). That requires the liberalization 
of the information environment and allowing truly independent information and opinions to flow 
relatively freely within the region. For instance, Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009) found that 
autocrats in countries with poorer natural resources tend to liberalize its media environment so 
that the autocrats and the bureaucrats can receive an independent source of information from free 
media. Alternatively, autocrats obtain key and diverse information for policymaking through the 
 establishment of elections, legislatures and other forms of consultative institutions that are not 
normally achieved without liberalizing the regime to some degree (Miller, 2015; Truex, 2016). 
When regimes liberalize, the number of political parties increases. As such, autocrats 
receive more policy-relevant information from these parties. The first notable explanation is the 
representation of interests. A greater number of elected lawmakers from different political parties 
in authoritarian legislature represent more diverse constituencies. Motivated by the incentive of 
re-election, elected political parties in authoritarian legislatures are more likely to represent the 
interests and expectations of their constituencies (Manion, 2017; Truex, 2016). If autocrats 
propose policies that could harm the interests of members of the constituencies, their 
representatives are likely to speak up, ask for major amendments or reject these policy proposals 
in order to protect their interests. Therefore, driven by representation to more diverse 
constituencies, autocrats’ issue diversity of the policy agenda is likely to increase. 
The second explanation is a greater number of political parties brings in more diverse 
political stances and socio-economic backgrounds. These wider backgrounds lead to the 
production of more diverse policy agenda and vice-versa. For example, Greene and O’Brien 
(2016) found that more female lawmakers in the legislature would lead to a greater issue diversity 
of the policy agenda and more left-leaning policies. Tam (2017) found that female lawmakers and 
liberal lawmakers are more likely to represent women’s interests. Political parties from more 
diverse socio-economic backgrounds, political ideologies and experiences provide more diverse 
information to policymakers and thus government produces policies that address a wider spread 
of issues (i.e. a more diverse policy agenda). 
 The third explanation is about problem definition (Kingdon, 1984). Because of electoral 
incentives, a greater number of political parties are more likely to present and advocate their 
problems to the policymakers. For example, political parties in the labour sectors are more likely 
to voice out problems related to employment, working conditions and labour welfares. Yet, the 
more problem the policymakers look at, the more problems they shall discover (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2015, pt. 1), and therefore the autocrats end up having to deal with a wider range of issues. 
The government thus have to seek for opinions and solutions on more diverse issues from 
different government agencies (Alexander et al., 2011), consultative committees and experts 
(e.g., scientists and economists) (Wilkinson, Lowe, & Donaldson, 2010). Because of greater 
freedom of speech and association, independent think tanks, non-governmental organizations, the 
media and citizens also have greater freedom and capacity to generate more policy-relevant 
reports to evaluate and monitor government’s performance and identify policy problems. 
In this way, autocrats face an increased quantity of information and informational 
diversity as the regimes liberalize. This, in theory, should result in a more diverse policy agenda 
with the attention of government having to be spread across a wider range of policy areas. It 
contradicts the bargaining perspective and results in a greater issue diversity of the policy agenda. 
A hybrid theory 
This article argues that the effects of the two competing processes—the bargaining 
process and information exchange process—on issue diversity of the policy agenda are not 
mutually exclusive. The two effects could have different degrees of impacts when the partisan 
composition of the legislature varies. Before the start of the political liberalization, a single 
political party (or single party dominant system) in authoritarian regimes provides a narrower 
scope of policy-relevant information to the governments. The level of issue diversity of the 
 policy agenda is thus lower. As regimes liberalize, the political systems change from a single 
party system to a multiple party system. The level of information exchange thus increases. In this 
process, governments benefit from receiving a greater amount of policy-relevant information 
from a wider range of perspectives and political ideologies. This pushes governments to allocate 
attention to a wider range of policy issues. However, one additional political party provide less 
new information as the total number of political parties increases. As a result, the marginal 
benefit of information exchange would be smaller when the number of political parties increases. 
On the other hand, the increasing number of political parties increases the marginal 
bargaining cost—more parties involved would make the bargaining process more difficult—and 
as dictated by the bargaining hypothesis, it reduces issue diversity of the policy agenda. As the 
marginal effect of information exchange diminishes and the marginal effect of the bargaining cost 
magnifies, it is expected that the two effects cancel each other and reach an equilibrium point, 
thus resulting in a maximum level of issue diversity of the policy agenda. 
Beyond the equilibrium, the marginal bargaining cost outweighs the marginal benefit of 
the information exchange. A very large number of political parties increases bargaining costs and 
thus reduces the number of policies produced. Lower policy outputs constrain the total size of the 
policy agenda space. Because of the confined agenda space, governments have to be strategic on 
the allocation of their political attention, and prioritize a narrower scope of policies (Jennings et 
al., 2011). Thus, issue diversity of the policy agenda declines as the number of political parties 
further increases. Therefore, by combining the insights of information exchange and bargaining 
cost perspectives, a hybrid model of the two countervailing processes predicts a negative 
quadratic (inverted-U) relationship between the number of political parties and issue diversity of 
the policy agenda. The hypothesis, therefore, states that: 
  
𝐻1 (hybrid hypothesis): There is a negative quadratic (inverted-U) relationship between the 
number of political parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda. 
 
Policymaking and political liberalization in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, to make law, it requires support from the simple majority in the legislature. 
Over the horizon of this study, the Hong Kong Government mostly dominated the lawmaking 
process (Lam, 2005). However, the process of political liberalization created an interesting 
dynamic to the lawmaking process in Hong Kong. 
Under the British rule before 1997, the Hong Kong Government “was effectively 
dictatorial, enabling the [G]overnor to exercise absolute control over the legislature” (Lam & 
Chan, 2015, p. 553). The executive (called Governor under the British rule) had the power to 
appoint all lawmakers to LegCo—it includes the official members (i.e., the senior officials of the 
Government) and unofficial members (i.e., business and social elites). As such, LegCo was 
regarded as “yes-men” (Miners, 1994, p. 224) which suggests the legislature as a rubber stamp 
and political information presented to the Government was not very diverse. While different 
opinions existed in the assembly, the Hong Kong Government was never publicly seen to be 
defeated before 1985, because the Governor could instruct the official members to abstain from 
the voting (Miners, 1994, p. 226). Before 1985, LegCo was basically controlled by the 
Government and the bargaining process was smooth. 
 In 1985, elections were introduced in Hong Kong, composing of functional 
constituencies—the professional and business interests—and electoral college—elected by 
members of municipal and district councils who are directly elected by the public. These non-
directly elected members, accounting for over 40 per cent of all lawmakers in the LegCo between 
1985 and 1991, joined the appointed members to scrutinize government bills. The electoral 
change also changed the composition of the legislature. Although lawmakers were observed to be 
more active in terms of speech and questions, there were only minor amendments and 
clarification in the contents of the bills (Miners, 1994, p. 230). 
The first direct election took place in 1991. The electoral college was abolished in the 
same year and replaced by geographical constituencies by direct election from the public. The 
proportion of elected members (versus appointed members) then increased to over 60 per cent 
from 1991. In 1995, appointed seats in LegCo were totally abolished and all members of LegCo 
are then directly elected by the electorates either in functional constituencies or geographical 
constituencies from 1995 onwards1. The system remains the same today. To summarize the 
regime change between 1975 and 2016, figure 1 represents the degree of political liberalization of 
                                                        
1 Even though both functional constituencies and geographical constituencies are directly elected 
by the electorates. The formation of electorates in these two constituencies is very different. As 
mentioned, electorates in geographical constituencies are the citizens in the corresponding 
geographical area with each person casting one vote. In functional constituencies, electorates 
vary and are decided by the sectorial interests. Some electorates are individuals (e.g., social 
workers and teachers). Some other electorates are corporates (e.g., insurance and accounting). 
 Hong Kong as reflected by the proportion of elected members (versus appointed members) in 
LegCo. 
After the introduction of direct election, the lawmakers became more active inside and 
outsides the legislature. As mentioned, the lawmakers questioned the Government and the bills 
more frequently (Gu, 2015). Some lawmakers, particularly the political opposition, were also 
active participants in various street demonstrations and protests (Ma, 2007). These represent 
more diverse political signals available to the Government. The lawmaking process, after the 
introduction of the direct election, was still dominated by the Government (Lam, 2005). 
However, the Government also faced unprecedented challenges. The national security legislation 
in 2003 presented a classic case study of how the Hong Kong Government lost the control of the 
lawmaking process. Ma (2005) argues that the mass protest against the national security 
legislation created an internal split of the governing elites as they feared subsequent defeats in the 
next election. Tam (2017) found that the introduction of elections increases the number of female 
lawmakers in LegCo and they are more vocal on women’s interests. As such, in line with the 
hybrid theory, the introduction of elections changed the behaviours of lawmakers and thus 
increased the information exchange as well as bargaining costs in the lawmaking process. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 Data 
Hong Kong’s legislative bills 
The unique case of Hong Kong offers a theoretically valuable contribution to the 
understanding of policymaking during a period of political liberalization. There is a number of 
reasons for this. First, Hong Kong’s gradual, and often embattled, political liberalization process 
started in 1985 and is still ongoing (Ma, 2007). The lengthy process of political liberalization 
allows political scientists to observe its dynamics and effects in greater details than a sharp 
transition that occurred in other cases such as the Czech Republic after the Velvet Revolution and 
the Spain transition in the late 1970s. 
Second, Baumgartner et al. (2017) have expressed concern over the data quality and 
accuracy of the reported budgetary data in authoritarian regimes because autocrats may falsify the 
budgets. The use of bill data could have a similar concern. However, the legislature and 
lawmaking process in authoritarian regimes are usually under the spotlights and thus are more 
transparent. Unlike budgetary data, the legislature has less incentive to cover the introduction of a 
certain bill or distort its details. Also, Hong Kong LegCo’s legislative activities are well 
documented and recorded by the authority. This provides high-quality and reliable data for 
systematic examination. 
Third, unlike many authoritarian regimes, Hong Kong has experienced a long period of 
press freedom and civil liberty since the colonial era. This provides more open and transparent 
information for rulers to make policies than many other autocrats. The implication is that the 
level of information supply from the press and civil society is a stably high over the period of 
study. As such, an advantage of studying the case of Hong Kong is that one can focus only on the 
 change of information provision as observed from the liberalization of the political systems, 
while avoiding the confounding effect of information provision from the liberalizing media and 
civil society that are likely observed in other liberalizing regimes. 
With all these reasons, Hong Kong is a unique and important case for examining the effect 
of political liberalization in a setting with stably high level of information supply from the media 
and civil society during the period. 
To test the hypothesis, this paper uses a novel dataset of Hong Kong’s legislative bills 
between August 1975 and July 2016 in which Hong Kong had experienced a gradual process of 
political liberalization from 1985. The novel dataset of legislative bills was scraped from the 
LegCo website http://legco.gov.hk/ under the Bill Database section. The total number of bills 
scraped was 2,645 during that period. The website contains both English and Chinese versions of 
the bills with the key information such as the bill title, first to third reading dates and the proposer 
of the bill. The bill dataset was scraped and processed by R on 4 Oct 2016 (for web scraping 
using R, see Munzert, Ruoba, Meiboner, and Nyhuis (2014)). In principle, all URLs of the bills 
were obtained first. With a full list of URLs, all bill information was retrieved and assembled into 
a long data format. The whole process takes about 1 hour on a normal laptop with normal internet 
speed. 
The policy contents of the legislative bills are coded according to the policy content 
coding system of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) http://www.comparativeagendas.net/ 
with slight revisions to adapt to the unique context of Hong Kong. The original CAP coding 
system contains 21 major areas of public policy (e.g., health, energy, transport) and has been 
applied to 23 national, supranational and subnational states such as the US, the UK, Canada, 
 Italy, Belgium, Netherland and Hong Kong. Hong Kong experienced a sovereignty transfer from 
the UK to China in 1997. Therefore, following Lam and Chan’s (2015) codebook, topic number 
32 “Relationship with the sovereign and related constitutional matters” is created to record any 
legislative bills that are related to the adaptation of colonial laws to the Basic Law. As such, the 
coding system for Hong Kong legislative bills contains 22 major topics instead of 21 topics in 
CAP. Table 1 lists out the 22 policy areas and the corresponding number of laws in each policy 
area between 1975 and 2016. 
 [Table 1 here] 
 
Issue diversity of the policy agenda 
The concept of issue diversity of the policy agenda is operationalized as the distribution of 
policy output across policy topics. Following the recommendation by Boydstun, Bevan, and 
Thomas (2014), this study uses Shannon’s H to measure issue diversity, which is defined as: 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = −∑(𝑝(𝑥𝑖)) × ln(𝑝(𝑥𝑖)) 
where 𝑥𝑖 represents a policy topic. 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) is the proportion of total bills in policy topic 𝑥𝑖. 
ln(𝑝(𝑥𝑖)) is the natural log of 𝑝(𝑥𝑖). A greater value of Shannon’s H represents a greater issue 
diversity, and vice versa. Between 1975 and 2016, the mean value of issue diversity is 2.3300. 
The standard deviation is 0.1902. 
Effective number of political parties 
The number of political parties is measured by Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective 
number of political parties (ENPP) and the incomplete data is adjusted according to Taagepera 
 (1997). ENPP represents the total number of influential political parties as measured by either 
vote share or seat share in a legislature. It is also a common measurement of party fragmentation 
in political science literature (e.g., Grofman & Kline, 2012; Maeda, 2015). ENPP represents the 
number of sizable political parties in the legislature and is a good indication of the partisan 
composition in the legislature. When the ENPP equals to about one, the political system is 
typically labelled as a one-party system or one-party-dominant system (e.g., mainland China and 
Singapore). By the same token, when ENPP equals to about two, it means that two comparable 
parties exist and compete in the political system (e.g., the US and the UK). Greater ENPP implies 
more equally sizable political parties participate in the political system. 
Figure 2 shows the adjusted and unadjusted ENPP between 1975 and 2016. The dashed 
line and dotted line represent the upper and lower bounds of ENPP by assuming that political 
parties or candidates that are coded as “others” or “no political affiliation” demonstrate extreme 
fragmentation and extreme united respectively. The solid line represents the adjusted value of 
ENPP based on the mentioned rules according to the ideology of political parties or candidates 
that are coded as “others” or “no political affiliation”. 
After adjustment, in general, the ENPP of Hong Kong LegCo goes upward over time. It 
was at 1 from 1975 to 1985 because all lawmakers were appointed. When indirect elections were 
introduced subsequently, the ENPP went upward to about 2.72 from 1985 and 2.83 from 1988. 
When the direct election was introduced in 1991, ENPP jumped to 5.01 and further jumped to 
over 6 from 1995. Between 2004 and 2008, it further increased to 8.41. It lowered to 7.26 
between 2008 and 2012 and jumped to 10.84 from 2012 to 2016. Between 1975 and 2016, the 
mean value of the effective number of political parties is 5.1769. The standard deviation is at 
3.2244. 
  
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Results 
How do autocrats allocate their attention and how does issue diversity of the policy 
agenda change over time during a period of political liberalization? This paper answers these 
questions by using the time-series data of LegCo’s legislative bills between 1975 and 2016. Issue 
diversity of the policy agenda is measured by Shannon’s H as recommended by Boydstun et al. 
(2014). When the score of issue diversity of the policy agenda is zero, it means that the attention 
is concentrated on a single topic out of the twenty-two possible topics. The maximum score of 
the issue diversity across twenty-two possible policy topic is ln(22) = 3.0910. Different values 
of the issue diversity show the variation in attention to a range of possible policy topics over 
time. This section first provides some visual inspection and later conducts a more rigorous time-
series analysis. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the number of political parties and issue diversity 
of the policy agenda. This figure shows a marginal upward trend in the issue diversity when the 
number of political parties was smaller than 3 (in and before 1990). When the party 
fragmentation is greater than 3 (after 1990), any additional increase in the number of political 
parties reduces issue diversity of the policy agenda. The general pattern is a negative quadratic 
relationship and can be fitted in an inverted-U curve as shown in figure 3. It provides support to 
𝐻1. 
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Time series regression analysis 
To conduct a more rigorous test of 𝐻1 with time-series data, an autoregressive distributed-
lag (ADL) model is applied. The merit of the ADL model is that it can account for the 
autoregressive effect of the lagged values of the dependent variable commonly presented in time-
series data. A full model for this research is represented in the following form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
where issue diversity of the policy agenda 𝑌𝑡 is a function of a linear combination of a 
constant term 𝛼0, the past values of issue diversity of the policy agenda 𝑌𝑡−1, the number of 
political parties 𝑋𝑡 and its squared term 𝑋𝑡
2, and the number of laws 𝐶𝑡 as a control variable. 𝜖𝑡 is 
a random shock. 
As mentioned, the issue diversity is measured by the entropy of policy areas, and the 
number of political parties is measured by the effective number of political parties. To support 
𝐻1, it is expected that a negative quadratic relationship exists between the number of political 
parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda. Therefore, 𝛽1 is expected to be positive, and 𝛽2 is 
expected to be negative. For the control variable, it is expected that a more number of laws would 
allow the governments to diversify the policy outputs than a lower number of laws. In addition, 
when a government faces more pressing problems (e.g., economic crisis), they are also more 
likely to focus on fewer issues. Therefore, the economy is also controlled in this model and it is 
measured by the GDP per capita released by Hong Kong’s Census and Statistics Department. 
 Hellwig (2012) and Bevan and Greene (2018) found that the effect of the economy is conditional 
on party transition. This study uses the number of years after the personnel change in LegCo to 
replace the party transition because there were no elections but only personnel change by 
appointment between 1975 and 1985. The Governors increased the size of LegCo in 1976, 1980, 
1983 and 1984, before the election started in 1985. The interaction between the economy and the 
years after the personnel change is also included as a control variable. An augmented Dickey-
Fuller test shows co-integration does not exist and thus the autoregressive distributed-lag model 
is appropriate. 
Table 2 shows the results of the time-series analysis with different autoregressive 
distributed-lag models based on the full model described above. Model 1 and 2 are the linear 
model of the number of political parties. Model 2 further adds the number of laws and the 
interaction between the economy and years after personnel change as a control variable. Model 3 
to 5 are a non-linear model with the squared term of the number of political parties. Model 4 
added the number of laws as control and model 5 is the full model described in the formula. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
  
Model 1 and 2 test the linear effect of the number of political parties on issue diversity of 
the policy agenda. The linear term of the number of political parties is significant (𝛽1 = −0.019, 
𝑝 < .05) and is negatively associated with issue diversity of the policy agenda. However, after 
controlling for the number of laws, economy and the years after the personnel change, model 2 
 shows that the linear term of the number of political parties is not significant at all conventional 
level of significance. It clearly shows that a greater number of political parties has no linear effect 
on issue diversity of the policy agenda in the presence of control variables. 
Model 3 to 5 test the non-linear effect of the number of political parties on issue diversity 
of the policy agenda. Model 3 shows that the negative quadratic effect is significant (𝛽1 = .056, 
𝑝 < .1 and 𝛽2 = −.007, 𝑝 < .05). Model 4, after controlling for the effect of the number of laws, 
shows that the negative quadratic effect is also significant (𝛽1 = .061, 𝑝 < .05 and 𝛽2 = −.007, 
𝑝 < .05). Model 5 shows the negative quadratic relationship is still robust but is only significant 
at 10% level of significance (𝛽1 = .068, 𝑝 < .1 and 𝛽2 = −.007, 𝑝 < .1), after controlling for 
the effects of the number of laws, economy and years after personnel change. It provides strong 
evidence to support 𝐻1: there is a negative quadratic relationship between the number of political 
parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda. Using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the results show that model 5 has the lowest value of 
AIC and BIC compared to the other four models. Thus, model 5 should be selected. 
Figure 4 shows the marginal-effect plot of model 5. It shows the marginal effect of the 
number of political parties, as a quadratic polynomial, on issue diversity of the policy agenda, 
after controlling for the number of laws, economy and years after personnel change. It represents 
how each unit change of the number of political parties have different effects on issue diversity of 
the policy agenda. Figure 4 shows a negative slope and the marginal effect declines as the 
number of political parties increases. The marginal effect is positive when the number of political 
parties is less than 4.5 and is negative beyond that point. It means that the issue diversity expands 
when the number of political parties is less than 4.5 and shrinks when it is greater than 4.5. This 
again provides clear evidence to show a negative-quadratic relationship between the number of 
 political parties and issue diversity of the policy agenda as stated in 𝐻1. The marginal benefit of 
information exchange diminishes, and the marginal bargaining costs magnify as the number of 
the political parties increases in liberalizing regimes. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The question of how autocrats allocate their political attention and change their issue 
diversity of the policy agenda during a period of gradual political liberalization is a fundamental 
and important question to the study of public administration and policy. Extant studies on issue 
diversity of the policy agenda focus on advanced democracies (Greene, 2016; Jennings et al., 
2011). The effect of regime transition is understudied. Similarly, the Comparative Agendas 
Project (CAP) is mostly featured in advanced democracies such as the US, the UK, Germany, 
Italy, and Canada. There are, however, only a few studies that examine policy agendas in non-
democratic regimes (Baumgartner et al., 2017; Chan & Zhao, 2016; Lam & Chan, 2015; Sebők & 
Berki, 2018). Baumgartner et al. (2017) have recently called for more studies to examine 
authoritarian regimes using the CAP system. This research responds to this gap by taking 
advantage of Hong Kong’s unique path of prolonged democratization, in which Hong Kong 
offers an important opportunity to observe the effect of political liberalization on issue diversity 
of the policy agenda. In addition, this study is also the first of its kind to use legislative bills to 
study autocratic policymaking while the existing studies primarily use budget data. As such, it 
 contributes to the comparative studies of policy agendas and extends the CAP coding systems to 
more non-democratic systems. 
The main contribution of this study is to provide a refined way of thinking by theorizing 
and examining a new hybrid model. It challenges the perspective offered by Lam and Chan 
(2015), Baumgartner et al. (2017) and Sebők and Berki (2018) that put the two processes as 
competing hypotheses. By drawing theories in regime transition, party politics and public policy 
(Baumgartner et al., 2013; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Cox & McCubbins, 2005; de Marchi 
& Laver, forthcoming; Eguia & Shepsle, 2015; Mayhew, 1991; Wahman, 2011), it advances our 
understanding of how the regime transition and the corresponding change in partisan composition 
of the legislature influence issue diversity of the policy agenda. It highlights how the bargaining 
and information exchange complementary to each other during a period of political liberalization. 
As regime liberalizes, the number of political parties in the legislature increases and it changes 
the partisan composition of the legislature. The change in electoral systems and the 
corresponding changes in the partisan composition of the legislature represent the duality of 
bargaining and information exchange processes—they are both the source of bargaining and the 
source of information exchange. The increased number of political parties, in turn, increases both 
the level of information exchange and bargaining costs for policymaking. The hybrid theory 
argues that, in liberalizing regimes, an increase in the number of political parties diminishes the 
marginal benefit of the information exchange supplied by the lawmakers but at the same time 
magnifies the marginal bargaining costs. As such, as regime liberalizes, an increase in the number 
of political parties have a negative quadratic (inverted-U) relationship with issue diversity of the 
policy agenda. 
 Analyzing a unique and novel time-series dataset of legislative bills from Hong Kong’s 
LegCo, the finding shows an unambiguous support to the hybrid theory—as regime liberalizes, 
an increase in the number of political parties have a negative quadratic (inverted-U) relationship 
with issue diversity of the policy agenda (𝐻1), after controlling for the effects of the number of 
laws, the economy and the years after personnel change in LegCo. The empirical evidence shows 
that the two competing processes—information exchange and bargaining—both take place 
together at different rates as the number of political parties varies. A small but increasing number 
of political parties, as seen from the initial liberalizing period 1975 to 1995, increases issue 
diversity of the policy agenda. A large but increasing number of political parties in the 
subsequent period shrinks issue diversity of the policy agenda. The novel dataset will facilitate 
more future comparative studies. 
Future research related to the debate of the policy agenda and comparative public policy 
needs to put the hybrid theory and the empirical finding presented here in a broader context. The 
bargaining and information exchange processes in policymaking have to be properly addressed. 
This study offers important theoretical and empirical insights to future comparative studies that 
examine the effect of political liberalization at a greater scale. The extension of the CAP coding 
systems to more non-democratic countries will offer a promising research agenda. 
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Table 1: Comparative Agendas Project codebook major topics and the number of laws between 
1975 and 2016. 
Topic Number Topic Names Number of laws 
1 Macroeconomics 314 
2 Civil Rights 22 
3 Health 161 
4 Agriculture 30 
5 Labour 177 
6 Education 78 
7 Environment 71 
8 Energy 14 
9 Immigration 60 
10 Transportation 237 
12 Law and Crime 448 
13 Social Welfare 57 
14 Housing 109 
15 Domestic Commerce 390 
16 Defense 9 
17 Technology 49 
18 Foreign Trade 69 
19 International Affairs 9 
20 Government Operations 196 
21 Public Lands 67 
23 Culture 8 
32 Sovereignty and Constitutional Affairs 70 
  
 Table 2: Time-series autoregressive distributed-lag model of issue diversity of the policy 
agenda. 
 Issue Diversity of the Policy Agenda 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Issue Diversity (lag 1) 0.165 0.049 -0.033 -0.123 -0.092 
 (0.208) (0.207) (0.186) (0.177) (0.194) 
Number of Political Parties -0.019* -0.009 0.056† 0.061* 0.068† 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) 
Number of Political Parties (squared)   -0.007
* -0.007* -0.007† 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Number of Laws  0.002  0.002 0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Economy  -0.006   -0.001 
  (0.008)   (0.008) 
Years after Seat Change  -0.029   -0.034 
  (0.049)   (0.045) 
Economy × Years after Seat Change  0.004   0.004 
  (0.003)   (0.003) 
Constant 2.039*** 2.177*** 2.388*** 2.412*** 2.369*** 
 (0.502) (0.486) (0.442) (0.453) (0.438) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.164 0.281 0.272 0.332 0.362 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.151 0.211 0.255 0.222 
Note: Entries represent unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .1 
   
 Figure legends: 
 
 
Figure 1: Degree of political liberalization as the proportion of elected members in the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council from 1975 to 2016.  
 
 Figure 2: The number of political parties as measured by the effective number of political parties 
(ENPP) between 1975 and 2016. The dashed line and dotted line represent the upper and lower 
bounds of ENPP by assuming political parties or candidates that coded as ‘others' or ‘no political 
affiliation' demonstrate extreme fragmentation and extreme united correspondingly. The solid 
line represents the adjusted value according to the ideology of political parties or candidates that 
coded as ‘others' or ‘no political affiliation'.  
 
 Figure 3: A negative quadratic (inverted-U) relationship between issue diversity and party 
fragmentation. 
 
 Figure 4: Marginal effects of the number of political parties at the 90% confidence interval.  
 
